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Abstract 
With rare exceptions sociologists have traditionally had little to say about the British 
monarchy. In the exceptional cases of the Durkheimian functionalism of Shils and 
Young (1953), the left humanism of Birnbaum (1955), or the archaic state/backward 
nation thesis of Nairn (1988), the British nation has been conceived as a homogenous 
mass. The brief episode of the Sex Pistols Jubilee year song 'God Save the Queen' 
exposed some of the divisions within the national 'mass', forcing a re-ordering of the 
balance between detachment and belonging to the Royal idea. I argue that the song 
acted as a kind of 'breaching experiment'. Its wilful provocation of Royalist sentiment 
revealed the level of sanction available to the media-industrial complex to enforce 
compliance to British self-images of loyal and devoted national communicants.  
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The monarchy, monopoly and masses 
A whole number of reasons have been proposed for the waning fortunes of the British 
royal family. In the 1980s followers of the Gramscian ‘hegemonic rule’ school (cf. 
Hall and Jacques, 1983) dubbed ‘authoritarian populism’ Margaret Thatcher’s neo-
liberal counter-revolution and her regal style, a contradictory mixture of anti-statism 
and competitive individualism, which began to undermine the prerogatives of 
traditional authority. For some feminists, the Diana death-cult is evidence of the 
challenge made to traditional patriarchal authority by a (post-)modern Material Girl. 
For others like Tom Nairn it is evidence of the slow tectonic shifts that the entire 
British superstructure needs to take to tackle the outdated ‘glamour of backwardness’, 
the constitutional source of UKanian decline.  
 
In each case the picture of Britain is a highly selective one, worked-up through a 
narrow selection of the ‘great ones’- Thatcher, Diana or Elizabeth II. Each provides a 
focus for unsatisfied desires for equality either of consumer choice (Hall and 
Jacques), powerful women inside the superstructure (feminism) or national self-
determination (Nairn). Missing here is any sense that cultural and political symbols 
and representations tell us hardly anything about the deep cleavages in the material 
practices of ‘British society’. Moreover, this focus on the ‘great ones’ rests on 
unspoken assumptions about the ‘low ones’, the invisible 53 million or so existing 
beyond the superstructural elites and media celebrities. In other words, some version 
of the ‘mass society’ thesis bolsters star-struck sociology. Of course, the old Frankfurt 
School idea of a homogenous social lump manipulated by the ‘culture industry’ is far 
too vulgar for dealing with today’s social and cultural complexities, depthless pick n’ 
mix identity construction, knowing narratives of the self, and so on - a narcissistic 
sociological obsession with the sacralised individual.  
 
British society had changed in numerous ways since the Coronation in 1952. It has 
been profoundly altered by the restructuring of the world economy, and technological 
and political change. Mike Savage (2002: 82, emphasis added) summarises such 
tumultuous change: 'Rapid mobility, new forms of risk and insecurity, the erosion of 
fixed social and territorial boundaries and the final eclipse of tradition have all been 
seen as elements of contemporary social change'. But is the 'final eclipse of tradition' 
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really at hand or is it a post-modern fantasy? In this radically changed world a 
traditional focus on social class no longer fits for many contemporary sociologists. 
Class is seen as far too ambivalent as an 'identity' to any more form, to the extent that 
it ever did, the organising principle of how everyday life is experienced by individuals 
(Savage, 2002). Where attention is drawn to multiple social divisions of class, gender, 
'race’, place, nationality, disability and sexuality it is often to claim that they rarely 
reinforce each other (Braham and Janes, 2002). Nowadays social 'difference' and 
'contested cultural meanings' are increasingly highlighted. The mass society thesis 
thus loses out to a 'mass of difference' thesis. The baby of 'class' risks being thrown 
out with the bathwater of 'mass' society. 
 
At the height of the Thatcher years, for example, Hall and Jacques (1989: 2) could 
argue that Britain had changed utterly - 'not just incrementally but qualitatively' - and 
was increasingly characterised by 'diversity, differentiation and fragmentation, rather 
than homogeneity, standardisation and the economies and organisations of scale 
which characterised modern mass society'. Their earlier assumption about reactionary 
populism wielding hegemonic influence over a large mass dissolves into a de-centred 
world of multiple identities. The increasingly near-monopoly conditions that prevail 
across the culture industry are bracketed-out as too unseemly ‘economistic’.  
 
Yet, just as there has been deep and profound change in British society so also has 
there been continuing trends and patterns from the 1950s. In terms of income and 
wealth, material inequalities in Britain have worsened and social polarisation has 
grown apace (cf. Ferguson, Lavalette and Mooney, 2002). Fears about the 
Americanisation of popular culture raised by Richard Hoggart in the 1950s seem to 
have been fully realised as US mega-corporations like McDonalds, Disney, Nike and 
Budweiser vie for domination within global consumer capitalism (Herman and 
McChesney, 1997). If the term ‘cultural capital’ means anything under near monopoly 
conditions then it has little to do with Bourdieu’s sense of a set of prestigious class-
based dispositions and tastes. This refers to ‘capital’ in the banal sense meant by 
orthodox economics of a personalised stock of marketable resources.  
 
Alternatively, cultural capital can be viewed as a branch of circulating capital rather 
like finance capital or state capital. Cultural capital is cultural because it primarily 
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trades in signs rather than physical commodities. CDs are available in the marketplace 
not simply because they take the form of a silvery coloured disc shape, though this is 
not unimportant, but because of the culturally meaningful signs that are encoded onto 
the disc, its packaging and the wider cultural dialogue surrounding its production. But 
it is also capital, a commodity upon whose sale the music-industrial complex hopes to 
realise its profits and begin a new round of accumulation. What Simon Frith (1992: 
52) argued for the music industry applies to more general processes of cultural 
production: 'Youth music itself has been routinized, and what matters to the industry 
in this context is the illusion of change, the illusion necessary for continued sales'.  
 
Today, pop’s built-in obsolescence, its slavish devotion to the nearly-new sound and 
the familiar lyric, helps stabilise tradition and routinise pop’s shock value. However, 
now and then pop rejects the prevailing industry standard and radically posits a 
different sound and sentiment. My interest here is in one such cultural moment where 
masses, monarchy, and music collided: the Sex Pistols song ‘God Save the Queen’. 
While the background may be well known I wish to situate this historically by briefly 
considering the sociology of the monarchy beginning with the Coronation twenty-five 
years earlier. The brief episode of the Sex Pistols Jubilee year song 'God Save the 
Queen' exposed some of the divisions within the national 'mass', forcing a re-ordering 
of the balance between detachment and belonging to the Royal idea. I argue that the 
song acted as a kind of 'breaching experiment'. Its wilful provocation of Royalist 
sentiment revealed the level of sanction available to the media-industrial complex to 
enforce compliance to British self-images of loyal and devoted national 
communicants.  
 
Sociology and national communion 
Sociologists have traditionally had little to say about the British monarchy and its 
place in the national imagination. The monarchy forms part of the unspoken backdrop 
of class relations, culture and politics in Britain. Where it has come into sociological 
view at all it has usually been as a result of a royal ceremonial like the Coronation or 
Royal Wedding, or a public spectacle like that around the death of Diana Spencer-
Windsor. A start was made in the very first volume of Sociological Review when 
Shils and Young (1953) invoked Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of Religious Life to 
explicate the Coronation of Elizabeth II. At the outset they state, ‘The heart has its 
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reasons which the mind does not suspect’ (1953: 63). In other words the ‘ordinary 
people’, as they called them, partook of the Coronation ritual in a wholly unreflexive 
way. People at street parties in the East End of London displayed a ‘complete inability 
to say why they thought important the occasion they were honouring with such 
elaborate ritual’.  
 
The mystery of the incomprehensible ritual, ‘inchoate, dimly perceived and seldom 
explicit’ (1953: 80), was readily disclosed as an instance of the universal sacredness 
of the value structure of society. Only through regular moments of ‘national 
communion’ can the irrational desires and hostilities of ‘society’ be quelled and put 
under greater values and moral rules, expressed by the very person of the ‘great ones’. 
In this way ‘the preponderance of positive devotion to the moral rules’ may be re-
established (1953: 66-7). The Coronation was thus the ceremonial occasion par 
excellence for ‘the affirmation of the moral rules by which the society lives. It was an 
act of national communion’ (1953: 67). By giving the ‘low ones’ some proximity to 
the ‘great ones’ the sacredness of moral national consensus is renewed.  
 
By the 1950s, the eminent sociologists explained, the British working class had been 
tamed by warfare, welfare and regular employment. No longer unruly, violent and 
hostile towards the symbols of ruling class power working class consciousness had 
been deeply assimilated ‘into the moral consensus of British society … [as] one of the 
great collective achievements of modern times’ (1953: 76). Any lingering hostility felt 
by the working class had been effectively extinguished by their devotion to Elizabeth 
II as a sacred love-object: ‘when love is directed towards a genuinely love-worthy 
object [it] reduces the intensity of hatred as well’ (1953: 78). ‘Contact with this vessel 
of the sacred values’ (1953: 80) provided such an intensive feeling of belonging that 
class hatred could only recede further.2 
 
It is little wonder that in his scathing study of the monarchy, The Enchanted Glass, 
Tom Nairn (1988: 115-20) called this episode ‘the Sociology of Grovelling, Part 1’. 
In his response to Shils and Young, Norman Birnbaum (1955: 23) balked at any talk 
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of the nationally integrative function of the Coronation, concluding that ‘it is a 
considerable disservice to sociology to present our discipline as a useful handmaiden 
of the current effort to make a conservative ideology once more orthodox and 
unquestioned’. For Birnbaum the British working class remained largely 
unassimilated to middle class values in contrast to the embourgeoisment of the US 
working class. The value hierarchy between ‘the great’ and ‘the low’ is inverted by 
Birnbaum: the bitter struggles of the labour movement dragged the monarchy and the 
rest of the ruling class into a properly national moral life for the first time. But later 
Birnbaum returns to the unassimilated nature of the working class. Precisely the 
absence of shared values gave the Coronation its special salience as a break from 
routine, a temporary relief from conflict, and the fascination with the Queen had less 
to do with reverence, worship and devotion than with the ‘cult of adulation built up 
around certain film stars’ (1955: 19).  
 
This is all grist to the mill of Nairn’s thesis that superstructural ‘backwardness’ 
reflects the ‘backwardness’ of society. Thus, despite their crawling, Shils and Young 
are not entirely mistaken about society being in thrall to archaic institutions like the 
monarchy. Nairn (1988: 122) scoffs gleefully at the academic politeness of the debate 
‘(where Professors accuse one another of “not entirely escaping ambiguity” and 
failing to “present events in scientific terms”)’ and their tacit consensus that the 
monarchy is really a side-show, alternately ‘tinsel revels’ or a sacred national altar 
piece. The anti-modern political authority of the monarchy in its guise as 
‘constitutional monarch’ is, for Nairn, entirely neglected behind the shared phoney 
dichotomy between ‘show and reality’.  
 
Birnbaum’s humanist mission of a pure working class, undefiled by the taint of 
national solidarity, making steady progress towards a more democratic form of life, 
provokes still more vituperation from Nairn, who dubs Birnbaum’s intervention ‘the 
Sociology of Grovelling, Part 2’. After all, the monarchy is ‘an archaic institution’ 
and, as such, ‘may express something deeply and incorrigibly archaic about the 
society whose institution it is’ (Nairn, 1988: 128). Not many Marxists would escape 
censure for the kind of crude base-superstructure model deployed by Nairn. However, 
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the elusive style of his writing often makes it difficult to cut through the thicket in 
order to arrive at what precisely Nairn’s position on the prospects for the monarchy 
actually is, given that it still reflects a backward society. In any case, when the first 
edition of Nairn’s The Enchanted Glass appeared in 1988 it was deeply marked by the 
popularity of the monarchy, a popularity which was soon to be reversed in the 1990s, 
though it is less clear whether society is any less ‘backward’ now than then. 
 
The Royal balancing act 
As Michael Billig (1992) notes many studies misleadingly focus on the glamour, 
grandeur or spectacle of the monarchy. The daily reproduction of the monarchy is 
obscured by an exclusive concentration on the meaning and significance of state 
formality. For one thing the tradition of the royal ceremonial is rich in its capacity for 
re-invention and adaptation (Cannadine, 1983). Even more to the point is that the 
focus on the extraordinary ‘one-off’ event is the partner to the focus on the 
personalities and caprice of the ‘great ones’. This works to the detriment of a 
sociological understanding of the everyday ‘ordinariness’ of the unequal conditions of 
social life for most of the population in contrast to the unearned fortunes and inherited 
privileges of the Windsor family.  
 
Other studies, like the Mass Observation [sic] project, have documented the role of 
and feelings towards the monarchy in the everyday lives of the ‘low ones’ (Ziegler, 
1977). The popularity of the monarchy tends to be confirmed by social surveys. For 
instance, less than 9 per cent of respondents to the 1995 British Social Attitudes 
survey agreed that the monarchy should be abolished while two-thirds thought the 
monarchy important for Britain and supported the heredity principle of succession 
(Jowell, et al, 1996: 253). The figures supporting the monarchy in 1999 were almost 
identical, indicating a high level of consistency (Jowell, et al, 2000: 294). This level 
of support tends to be lower in London and fell to only half in Scotland, suggesting a 
much weaker attachment to the symbols of Britishness and/or inherited privilege 
(Jowell, et al, 1996: 13).  
 
Acceptance of this state of affairs is, for Billig, not as straightforward as 'snapshot' 
surveys or the mass society perspective suggest. Common sense is arrived at through 
‘ideological dilemmas’, which are argued out by utilising common themes to deal 
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with the gaps in what Gramsci (1971) called ‘contradictory consciousness’. This 
allows some dialogical play between social practices and ideology and permits more 
qualified and dynamic accounts of the cultural mediation of the monarchy, one far 
removed from the idea of ‘the mass’ that informs Birnbaum’s humanist account of the 
noble proletariat, Shils and Young’s sacred functionalism and Nairn’s elevated, 
metaphysical generalities about national ‘spirit-essence’ and the like.  
 
The monarchy form part and parcel of the familiar routine and repetition of the 
everyday. Billig’s key argument is that in their everyday speech ordinary British 
‘subjects’ negotiate the Royals as an ideological dilemma through a sense of what I 
will call ‘detached belonging’. This allows them to navigate the various distances 
between proximity and remoteness to the ‘great ones’, to be both loyal and 
treasonous, formal and familiar, respectful and mocking, and so on. The daily 
struggle of the monarchy thus becomes one of instilling among its subjects a balance 
between detachment and belonging. Too much reserve, as in the outcry over the 
Queen’s ‘discretion’ during the media-led mourning over Diana, risks alienating their 
public. On the other hand, too much familiarity, say over Royal sex lives, risks 
breeding popular contempt as the mysterious distance recedes to nought.  
 
Into the breach 
The Queen’s Silver Jubilee in 1977 provides the occasion for re-considering the 
relationship between the mass and the figurehead. Unlike 1953 this time the social 
and cultural ‘meaning’ of the monarchy was not confined to the pages of an academic 
journal but was played out in front of society. The release of the Sex Pistols single 
‘God Save the Queen’ in May 1977 acted as kind of ‘breaching’ experiment across 
British society. Harold Garfinkel’s (1967: 53) original ‘breaching’ experiment sought 
to bring to the surface the ‘seen but unnoticed’ background features of the everyday 
based on his assumption that common understanding consists in ‘compliance with the 
expectancies of everyday life as a morality’. Disruptions to everyday expectations of 
what constitutes appropriate conduct potentially sheds greater light on the taken-for-
granted than, for example, what people might say in the interview setting.  
 
One risk that Royal rituals such as the Jubilee run is that conventional expectations of 
popular allegiance and the wholesale silencing of republican sentiment might come 
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under direct challenge. The ‘seen but unnoticed’ might be breached. Political 
opposition to the Jubilee in 1977 was relatively muted, confined to the Marxist left, 
such as the Socialist Workers’ Party’s ‘Stuff the Jubilee’ campaign. On the surface the 
Jubilee proved a great success. After a slow start, lack of popular interest had been 
transformed by the time of Jubilee weekend of 4-5 June, with English streets filled 
with bunting and Union flags, around 4,000 street parties in London alone and an 
estimated crowd of one million turning out for the Royal Procession on 7 June. In 
Scotland popular euphoria was much less evident, despite an extra two days’ paid 
holiday. Many of the special Jubilee mugs given to Glasgow schoolchildren were 
smashed off playground walls. It was this defiant audience that the Sex Pistols tapped 
into. 
 
Image, sound and words combine in the Sex Pistols to force a 'taking of sides' 
throughout society. Subsequently, this has been recovered as simply another stitch 
being added to ‘rich tapestry’ of British rock heritage and a straight line drawn to the 
utopian elements of 1960s hippy ‘counter-culture’ (Home, 1991; McKay, 1996). It 
was not understood as such at the time. In general, the group's appearance and 
demeanour seemed threatening to good taste and good order, belligerently sneering 
and swearing, dressed in an anti-glamour style of tattered clothing, bent postures and 
contorted facial expressions. Nothing could have been more removed from the 
uniform, upright hygiene of Royal dress. The sound added a distorted intensity to pop 
music, a sharp, jarring noise compared with the polished production jobs in the pop 
charts and a shock against the complacent 'virtuoso' sounds of 'progressive' rock. 
While 'God Save the Queen' deployed chord patterns familiar to rock n' roll the song's 
anger and venom, sounds spat out rather than played or sang, replaced the more 
overtly sexual energies of traditional pop.  
 
The consternation raised by the image and sound of punk was matched by the song's 
lyrics. 'God Save the Queen' was chosen as the title, against the original 'No Future', 
precisely to maximise the level of provocation. By calling direct attention to the 
official national anthem the Sex Pistols forced their alternative version into public 
consciousness. The song's words openly flouted pop etiquette by questioning the 
nature of the society and the role of the Crown. The state is outrageously compared to 
'a fascist regime', which has turned the Queen into its servant, 'they've made you a 
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moron'. The archaic Imperial hangover is compared to 'a mad parade' which has sent 
the English nation to sleep, 'England's dreaming', avoiding the realties of its own 
pitiful subjugation. John Rotten, the singer, sneers, 'We're the future - your future', 
implying that the whole social edifice will soon face a serious threat, 'a potential H-
bomb', to its continued existence.  
 
An overwhelming force of hype and spectacle demanded and expected public 
conformity during the Jubilee with its heightened moral rules of national communion. 
The Sex Pistols exposed the underlying levels of coercion held in reserve for any 
rejection of compliance with the sovereign order of things (Savage, 2001). First, 
workers at the manufacturing plant pressing the single went on strike over its anti-
monarchy sentiment and the following day platemakers refused to print the record 
sleeve, which had Jamie Reid’s artwork depicting a safety pin through the mouth of 
the official Cecil Beaton portrait of the Queen.3 Second, the promotional campaign 
was beset by a series of bans as the media-industrial complex moved to suppress its 
gross infringement of decency and taste. Adverts were banned from TV and radio and 
both the IBA and the BBC banned the single itself. Major retailers like Woolworths, 
Boots and WH Smiths refused to stock the single. Third, when the Sex Pistols still 
managed to sell 200,000 copies in a fortnight ‘God Save the Queen’ was kept from 
the number one position in the national pop charts by a Rod Stewart single, despite 
‘God Save the Queen’ selling twice as many that week. Credible allegations 
circulated of chart-fixing. Virgin record stores, owned by the same company as the 
Sex Pistols label, were removed from the weekly census of record sales (Savage, 
2001: 364-5). Finally, MPs and the tabloid press led a moral panic to ‘destroy’ the 
Sex Pistols, leading to physical assaults on members of group. 
 
Out of the breach  
In the Silver Jubilee week the Sex Pistols acted as a kind of ‘breaching’ experiment, 
bringing to the surface the kinds of coercion that routinely, ‘seen but unnoticed’, 
underwrote the investment in the monarch with devotional levels of national 
communion. Yet once doubts were forcibly raised in front of the public any casual 
sense of tacit consensus about the monarchy was disturbed. In hindsight 1977 was 
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perhaps the final point around which such an operation of enforced compliance could 
be mounted to stabilise the British monarch’s position as a sacred object, embodying 
the desires and fears of a mythical, unified mass by welding it into a glorious national 
community.  
 
By 2002, the year of the Golden Jubilee, the former Sex Pistols singer and lyric 
writer, John Lydon, could claim to have always been ambivalent towards the 
monarchy. ‘I was never pro them or anti them. I just think that if we are going to have 
a monarchy it may as well work properly’ (in Hattenstone, 2002: 2). Lydon thus 
deploys one of the familiar themes noted by Billig in the cynical negotiation of 
detached belonging, that of ‘double-declaiming’. Lydon now claims to stand neither 
for or against the monarchy, neither wholly opposed nor wholly embraced, but 
maintains an aloof independence from the ideological dilemma of the monarchy’s 
inherited privilege. Indeed, any hint of opposition completely gives way to fatalistic 
acceptance - so long as the monarchy exists let’s make it work. Contrary to this 
cynical ambivalence, when Lydon was Rotten his ‘God Save the Queen’ was 
understood on all sides as a breach of Royalist etiquette, not a plea to perfect it. It 
gave cultural expression to and helped shape the fissures between mass and 
figurehead. Indeed, Dave Laing's (1989: 77) analysis of Rotten's vocal style identified 
the gratuitous pleasure the singer takes, and which the audience is also invited to take. 
The accentuated phrasing deployed in comparing the Queen to a 'mo-rrr-on-er' 
'connotes a relish on the part of the singer in making the comparison'. 
 
Former Sex Pistols manager, Malcolm McLaren (2002), remains utterly opposed to 
the Royal Family, ‘a story about hypocrisy and at the same time a story about Britain. 
A celebrity brand with an immense PR machine behind it … They are a brilliant 
metaphor for all that is pretentious, deluded, selfish and insincere with the UK’. 
Whether a ‘story’, ‘a brand’ or ‘a metaphor’, nothing is coming into view remotely 
capable of the breach committed by ‘God Save the Queen’ twenty-five years ago. 
McLaren complains that Jamie Reid’s ‘Queen’ artwork is now sold as a T-shirt in 
Beverly Hills and is modelled for fashion magazines like Vogue: ‘the slogan is now 
the antithesis of what it originally stood for, and its imaging inadvertently could be 
said to help promote the brand, the royal family, the “firm” (as the Duke of Edinburgh 
is so fond of saying - actually a term often used to describe a criminal gang), the 
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Queen’. When everyday ideological arguments about the monarchy are conducted in a 
low key cultural capital recuperates the subversive image, as Adorno anticipated. 
Individuals may argue over contradictory ideas or ideological dilemmas about the 
monarchy but a wider culture of compliance will prevail so long as ideological 
alternatives remain submerged. 
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